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CEPT BONDS INSTEAD OF MONEY IN REDEMPTION-Plaintiffs owned 6 percent
cumulative convertible prior preferred stock in defendant corporation. The
stock had a stated value of $100 per share, and was redeemable at the option
of the corporation at $115 per share plus accumulated dividends. By vote of
more than two-thirds of the outstanding shares of each class of stock issued,
defendant's articles of incorporation were amended to authorize its board
of directors to redeem the prior stock at $120 per share, payable in the
company's 5 percent 30-year debentures. Interest on the debentures was to
be cumulative, paid out of earnings, and subordinated to the other indebtedness of the company. Redemption was to be compulsory. Plaintiffs
sought a declaratory judgment that the amendment was invalid. On appeal
from a judgment for defendant, held, reversed. The amendment in question
was beyond the powers of amendment given by the statute to the corporation. Bowman v. Armour & Co., (Ill. 1959) 160 N.E. (2d) 753.
As a result of the adoption of the "contract view" of corporate charters in
the Dartmouth College case,1 states have invariably reserved broad powers
to alter, amend, or repeal corporate charters which they grant.2 When a
state chooses to delegate by permissive legislation at least a part of its reserved power of amendment to a corporation or a certain percentage in interest of its stockholders, nvo types of limitations are imposed on the scope
and exercise of this delegated power. First, no amendment will be sustained which impairs "vested rights" existing under the charter,3 or which
substantially changes the original scope and objects of the corporation.4
The second type of limitation arises out of the common restriction placed
on all delegated powers: they may be exercised only within the terms upon
which they have been granted by the legislature. Therefore, when a dissenting stockholder contests a charter amendment, a question of statutory
construction regarding the scope of the delegated power to amend must
first be decided before considerations such as vested rights can ever be
relevant. This initial stage of statutory interpretation is the one at which
the court purports to resolve the principal case.5 Aside from the fact that
the precise issue seems to be one of first impression,s the decision is also
1 Dartmouth College
2 E.g., Ill. Rev. Stat.

v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 518 (1819).
(1959) c. 32, §157.162.
3 See Gibson, "How Fixed Are Class Shareholder Rights?" 23 LAw AND CoNTEM. PROB.
282 (1958); Meck, "Accrued Dividends on Cumulative Preferred Stock: The Legal Doctrine," 55 HARV. L. REv. 71 (1941); comment, 39 MICH. L. REv. 1201 (1941); 8 A.L.R. (2d)
893 (1949); 27 A.L.R. (2d) 1097 (1953).
4 Dodd, "Dissenting Stockholders and Amendments to Corporate Charters," 75 UNIV.
PA. L. REv. 585, 723 (1927). See also comment, 69 HARv. L. REv. 538 (1956); 105 A.L.R.
1452 (1936); 117 A.L.R. 1290 (1938).
5 Principal case at 755.
6 No other case has been found dealing with compulsory redemption of all of the
stockholder's ownership interest with bonds. As mentioned in the principal case at page
758, such decisions as Berger v. United States Steel Corp., 63 N.J. Eq. 809, 53 A. 68 (1902),
revg. 63 N.J. Eq. 506, 53 A. 14 (1902), are distinguishable since redemption in these cases
was not compulsory. Cf. Goldman v. Postal Telegraph, Inc., (D.C. Del. 1943) 52 F. Supp.
763 (allowing charter amendment changing liquidation preferences of preferred stock
from cash to bonds); In re Thomas de La Rue & Co., Limited and Reduced, (1911] 2 Ch.
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significant because of the extremely strict construction it imposes on broad
statutory language defining permissible charter amendments. The Illinois
Business Corporations Act allows amendment of corporate charters in very
broad and general terms. The corporation may amend its articles "in any
and as many respects as may be desired, provided that its articles of incorporation as amended contain only such provisions as might be lawfully contained in original articles of incorporation."7 Stock may be created "with
such designations, preferences, qualifications, limitations, restrictions, and
such special or relative rights as shall be stated in the articles of incorporation."8 In addition to this language, which by itself would appear to
authorize redemption provisions,9 the act proceeds to specify: "Without
limiting the authority herein contained, a corporation, when so provided in
its articles of incorporation, may issue shares of preferred or special classes:
(a) Subject to the right of the corporation to redeem any of such shares at
not exceeding the price fixed by the articles of incorporation for the redemption thereof. . . ."1° The court in the principal case, confronted with this
sweeping language, invokes the canon of construction that this, like any
other statutory grant of power, is to be strictly construed.11 It finds that
because of the above statutory language, the only redemption provisions
which may appear in the corporation's original articles of incorporation are
those calling for redemption for a "price"; that "price" means money and
nothing else; and that therefore an amendment allowing redemption with
bonds is ultra vires.12 In thus holding that the Illinois Business Corporation
Act allows redemption only in cash, the court adopts a construction which
seems clearly inconsistent with the liberal intent manifest in the legislature's sweeping language in the statute. Other jurisdictions have allowed
stock to be redeemed for products,13 services,14 or promissory notes.15 In
a series of New Jersey decisions16 redemption for bonds has been explicitly
Div. 361 (allowing reduction of outstanding preferred stock by issuance of debentures
therefor); and Dratz v. Occidental Hotel Co., 325 Mich. 699, 39 N.W. (2d) 341 (1949)
(through merger with wholly owned subsidiary, one-half of preferred stock outstanding
before merger converted into 3% bonds).
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1959) c. 32, §157.52.
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1959) c. 32, §157 .14.
9 Redemption provisions have been referred

to as "restrictions" or "qualifications" in
Lewis v. H. P. Hood &: Sons, Inc., 331 Mass. 670, 121 N.E. (2d) 850 (1954); as part of a
contractual "preference" in Crimmins &: Peirce Co. v. Kidder Peabody Acceptance Corp.,
282 Mass. 367, 185 N.E. 383 (1933); and as "rights" in Gunther Grocery Co. v. Hazel, 179
Ky. 775, 201 S.W. 336 (1918) and Butler v. Beach, 82 Conn. 417, 74 A. 748 (1909).
10 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1959) c. 32, §157 .14. Emphasis added.
11 Principal case at 756.
12 Principal case at 758-759.
18 National Sewer Pipe Co. v. Smith-Jaycox Lumber Co., 183 Iowa 17, 166 N.W. 708
(1918).
14 Oklahoma Hotel Building Co. v. Houghton, 202 Okla. 591, 216 P. (2d) 288 (1949).
15 Sanford v. First Nat. Bank, (8th Cir. 1916) 238 F. 298.
16 Berger v. United States Steel Corp., note 6 supra; Allen v. Francisco Sugar Co., (3d
Cir. 1912) 193 F. 825; Alabama Consolidated Coal &: Iron Co. v. Baltimore Trust Co., (D.C.
Md. 1912) 197 F. 347; C. H. Venner Co. v. United States Steel Corp., (C.C. N.Y. 1902) 116
F. 1012.
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allowed. Contrary to the court's claim in the principal case,17 the redemption with bonds in these decisions was not "based upon a specific and
peculiar statutory provision,"18 but rather upon a section of the New Jersey
General Corporation Act of 1896 worded much like the Illinois statute in
question.19 The court disposes of cases in other jurisdictions cited by
counsel by stating the "general rule to be that preferred shares convertible
by the holders into bonds or credit obligations, call, in effect, for a purchase
by the corporation of its own shares, and like provisions for compulsory
redemption should be expressly prohibited."20 Here the court overlooks
the basic distinction that this "general rule" refers only to redemption
options in the hands of the shareholders, and is not applicable when the
option is in the corporation. The rationale of the rule is that exercise of the
option by the shareholders may force such a sudden and extreme diminution
of the corporation's assets that its creditors may be prejudiced.21 Even if
this danger is admitted to be present when the option to redeem is in the
stockholders, it manifestly does not exist when the corporation itself decides
whether and when to redeem. Nevertheless, it is now apparently impossible
for an Illinois corporation to provide either in its original articles or by
amendment for redemption of preferred stock out of bonds. While it is
true that the facts in the principal case involved only a charter amendment,
the court's holding is necessarily broader in scope since by denying the
amendment the court had to conclude under the statutory language that
the provision could not have been "lawfully contained in the original
articles of incorporation."22 It is clear that the court considered the amendment objectionable mainly because of its compulsory operation upon nonassenting shareholders.28 But this reason surely is not sufficient to deny the
use of a compulsory redemption provision in the original charter since all
shareholders in the corporation will have assented to it merely by purchasing
their stock. Since the change from preferred stock to earnings bonds is not
17 Principal

case at 758.

1s The court refers to 2 N.J. Comp. Stat. (1910) §29a, a 1902 amendment to the New
Jersey General Corporation Act of 1896. This amendment, which merely imposed regulations on the pre-existing right to use bonds to redeem preferred stock, is found in its
present form in 14 N.J. Stat. Ann. (1939) §14:8-5.
19 2 N.J. Comp. Stat. (1910) §27: " .•. such preferred stock may, if desired, be made
subject to redemption at any time after three years from the issue thereof, at a price not
less than par..•." (Emphasis supplied.) See Berger v. United States Steel Corp., note 6
supra, at 823, and Allen v. Francisco Sugar Co., note 16 supra, at 836.
20 Principal case at page 758. Emphasis added.
21 See Hills, "Model Corporation Act," 48 HAR.v. L. REv. 1334 at 1352, n. 21, and 1353,
n. 23 (1935), and cases cited.
22 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1959) c. 32, §157.52, quoted in te.xt accompanying note 7 supra.
2S Principal case at 758: "It seems to us to be evident that the effect of the amendment
here sought to be sustained was, in fact, a purchase with bonds by the Armour company
of its own outstanding preferred stock without the consent of the owners of said stock.
While the Business Corporation Act does, under certain circumstances, permit a corporation to purchase its own stock, it can do so only when the shareholder is willing to sell, and
no amendment passed with the approval of a two-thirds vote of the shareholders can force
him to sell."
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at all a drastic one, 24 it would seem that in its efforts to protect non-assenting shareholders the court has traded too much freedom in corporate recapitalization for too little meaningful protection of stockholder interests.
It is certainly possible that the legislature intended the word "price" to
encompass more than cash; it is likewise at least arguable that the statutory
phrase permitting redemption for a "price" was not intended to be exclusive. Even if these interpretations are rejected, redemption with bonds
can be thought of merely as a postponed payment of cash.25 With these
interpretations open to it, it is regrettable that the court would choose an
approach so obviously out of harmony with the modem trend in both
courts and legislatures to give more and more freedom to corporations in
matters of recapitalization and charter amendment. 26
Clayton R. Smalley

24 Berl, "The Vanishing Distinction Between Creditors and Stockholders," 76 UNIV.
PA. L. REv. 814 (1928).
25 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1959) c. 32, §157.15 provides that there may be variations between
different series of stock as to "the price at and the terms and conditions on which shares
may be redeemed." (Emphasis supplied.) The Illinois Attorney General, in his opinion
on the validity of the amendment, relied on this section as showing a legislative intent that
the act did not require immediate payment of cash in redemption.
26 Rutledge, "Significant Trends in Modern Incorporation Statutes," 22 WASH. UNIV.
L. REv. 305 at 324 (1937).

